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1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal contributions of Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982), noncooper-
ative (or strategic) bargaining theory has ﬂourished in the past thirty years. The original
model of bilateral bargaining with alternating oﬀers and complete information has been
extended in a number of directions allowing for more general extensive forms, information
structure and more than two players (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Binmore, Os-
borne and Rubinstein (1992) for surveys). The development of the theoretical literature has
gone hand in hand with, and for a large part has been motivated by, the broad range of
applications of bargaining models. These include labor, family, legal, housing, political, and
international negotiations (e.g. Muthoo (1999)). The increased availability of data on the
outcomes of such negotiations as well as on the details of the bargaining process has also
stimulated a surge in empirical work, where casual empiricism has progressively led the way
to more systematic attempts to take strategic bargaining models to data.
A theoretical framework that has been extensively used in empirical applications is the
stochastic bargaining model proposed by Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998). In this model, the
surplus to be allocated (or the “cake”) and the bargaining protocol (i.e. the order in which
players can make oﬀers and counteroﬀers), are allowed to evolve over time according to a
stochastic process. This feature makes the model ﬂexible (it provides a uniﬁed framework for
a large class of bargaining games). It also rationalizes the occurrence of delays in reaching
agreement (which are often observed in actual negotiations), in bargaining environments
with complete information. Moreover, for the case where players share a common discount
factor and their utility is linear in the amount of surplus they receive (which we refer to as the
“canonical model”), the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there are only
two players bargaining, and a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) when
negotiations are multilateral. The unique equilibrium admitted by the model is stochastic
and characterized by the solution of a ﬁxed-point problem which can be easily computed.
For all these reasons, the stochastic bargaining framework naturally lends itself to estimation
and has been used in a variety of empirical applications that range from the formation of
coalition governments in parliamentary democracy (Merlo (1997), Diermeier, Eraslan and
Merlo (2003)), to collective bargaining agreements (Diaz-Moreno and Galdon (2000)), to
corporate bankruptcy reorganizations (Eraslan (2008)), to the setting of industry standards
in product markets (Simcoe (2008)), and to sovereign debt renegotiations (Benjamin and
Wright (2008), Bi (2008), Ghosal, Miller and Thampanishvong (2010)).
The existing literature on the structural estimation of noncooperative bargaining models
is entirely parametric. In addition to the body of work cited above based on the stochastic2
framework, other bargaining models have also been speciﬁed and parametrically estimated
using a variety of data sets.1 However, little is known about whether the structural elements
of these models or the bargaining outcomes in counterfactual environments can be identiﬁed
without imposing parametric assumptions. This paper contributes to the literature on the
estimation of sequential bargaining models by providing positive results in the nonparametric
identiﬁcation and estimation of stochastic bargaining models. Our work is not intended to
advocate the complete removal of parametric assumptions on structural elements of these
models in estimations, as in most cases such speciﬁcations are instrumental for attaining
point-identiﬁcation and can be tested. Rather, our main objective is to understand the limit
of what can be learned about the model structure and rationalizable counterfactual outcomes
when researchers wish to remain agnostic about unknown elements of the model.2
Empirical contexts of stochastic bargaining games may diﬀer in what econometricians
observe in the data. These diﬀerences in general have important implications on identiﬁcation
of the model structures. Here, we consider three scenarios with increasing data limitations.
We refer to these scenarios as: “complete data” (where econometricians observe the size of
the surplus to be allocated, or “the cake”, in each period regardless of whether an agreement
is reached); “incomplete data with censored cakes” (where econometricians only observe the
size of the cake in the period when an agreement is reached); and “incomplete data with
unobservable cakes” (where econometricians only observe the timing of agreement, but never
observe the size of the surplus). In all three scenarios, econometricians observe the evolution
of a subset of the states that aﬀect the total surplus. To illustrate the three data scenarios
and introduce some useful notation, consider, for example, a situation where a group of
investors bargain over when to liquidate a portfolio they jointly own and how to divide the
proceeds. The size of the cake is the market value of the portfolio which is determined by
state variables, such as market or macroeconomic conditions, that evolve over time according
to a stochastic process. Certain state variables that aﬀect the market value of the portfolio
1For example, Sieg (2000) and Watanabe (2006) estimate a bargaining model with asymmetric informa-
tion or with uncommon priors, respectively, to study the timing and terms of medical malpractice dispute
resolutions. Merlo, Ortalo-Magne and Rust (2009) estimate a bargaining model with incomplete information
to study the timing and terms of residential real estate transactions.
2In this respect, our work is related to the growing literature on nonparametric identiﬁcation and tests of
empirical auction models, pioneered by Laﬀont and Vuong (1996), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Athey
and Haile (2002, 2007), Haile and Tamer (2003), Haile, Hong and Shum (2004), Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter
(2003). Chiappori and Donni (2006) also address related questions in the context of a static, cooperative (or
axiomatic) bargaining framework and derive suﬃcient conditions on the auxiliary assumptions of the model
under which the Nash bargaining solution generates testable restrictions. We do not review the (theoretical
or empirical) literature on cooperative bargaining here since it is outside of the scope of this paper.3
are observed by both the investors and the econometricians (OSV), while other state variables
are only known to the investors but are not observed by the econometricians (USV). In the
complete data scenario, the econometricians observe the evolution of the market value of
the portfolio at all dates throughout the negotiation. This situation would arise for example
if the portfolio is entirely composed of publicly traded stocks. In the second scenario, the
econometricians only observe the market value of the portfolio when an agreement is reached
but not in any other period during the negotiation. This would be the case if for example
the portfolio is composed of non-publicly traded securities, but the sale price is recorded.
Finally, in the third scenario with the least data, the econometricians only observe the timing
of agreements but never observe the market value of the portfolio. This would be the case if
for example the only available information is when a partnership is dissolved but the details
of the settlement are kept conﬁdential (e.g. because of a court order).
For the case of complete data, we derive conditions for a joint distribution of observed
states, surplus, agreements and divisions of the cake to be rationalized by a stochastic se-
quential bargaining model. We show how to recover the common discount factor from such
rationalizable distributions when the total surplus is monotone in USV. We also characterize
the identiﬁed set for the mapping from states to surplus (i.e. the “cake function”), and show
it can be recovered under an appropriate normalization. For the case of incomplete data
with censored cakes, we show that when the total surplus is additively separable in OSV and
USV, then the impact of OSV on surplus is identiﬁed, provided the USV distribution satisﬁes
some exclusion restrictions. For both data scenarios we provide consistent estimators of the
discount factor and the cake function. Also, we illustrate our approach for estimation with
an empirical application.
In the data scenario with unobserved cakes, earlier results in Berry and Tamer (2006)
on identifying optimal stopping problems also apply in the context of stochastic bargaining
under the assumption that the USV distribution is known to the econometricians. Our
contribution in this scenario is to relax the assumption of a known USV distribution, and
show that partial identiﬁcation of counterfactual outcomes (i.e. the probability of reaching an
agreement conditional on observed states) is possible under nonparametric shape restrictions
on the cake function and independence of USV. Our approach is motivated by the fact
that the cake function is often known to satisfy certain shape restrictions derived from
economic theory.3 We argue such knowledge can be exploited to at least conﬁne rationalizable
counterfactual outcomes to an informative subset of the outcome space, with the aid of
3For example, the expected market value of a portfolio of foreign assets must be monotone in exchange
rates holding other state variables ﬁxed.4
nonparametric restrictions such as independence of USV. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
positive result in identifying counterfactuals in optimal stopping models without assuming
knowledge of the USV distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the canonical model of
stochastic sequential bargaining and characterizes its equilibrium. It also describes the three
data scenarios we consider and relates them to the existing empirical literature. Sections 3,
4 and 5 present our results on identiﬁcation and estimation of the canonical model in the
complete data, incomplete data with censored cakes and incomplete data with unobservable
cakes scenarios, respectively. Section 6 concludes by discussing identiﬁcation in extensions
of the canonical model and directions for future research.
2 The Canonical Model of Stochastic Bargaining
Many real bargaining situations involve negotiations among two or more players over the
allocation of some surplus. In many negotiations, the terms of an agreement may depend
on aspects of the environment which change during the negotiating period. In such cases,
the surplus to be allocated may evolve stochastically over time, and naturally lead to the
possibility that agreement is delayed whenever the players perceive that a better agreement
m a yb ea c h i e v e db yw a i t i n g .
To analyze these situations, Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) propose a general class of
sequential bargaining games with complete information in which both the surplus to be
allocated and the identity of the proposer follow a stochastic process. Here, we describe the
prototypical stochastic sequential bargaining model which is commonly used in empirical
applications (which we refer to as the “canonical model”).
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon bargaining game with  ≥ 2 players (denoted by  =
1) who share the same discount factor  ∈ (01). I ne a c hp e r i o d =0 1,a l l
players observe a vector of states ( ) with support Ω. (Throughout the paper, we
use Ω to denote the support of a generic random vector ,a n d to denote its history
up to, and including, period , i.e.  ≡ {0 1 }.) The realized state ( ) deter-
mines the set of feasible utility vectors to be allocated in period , C ( ) ≡ { ∈ R
+ :
P
=1  ≤ ( )},w h e r e : Ω → R1
+ determines the total surplus to be agreed upon
in that period, or the size of the “cake”.4 In each period, player  is randomly selected to
4This environment assumes that the players have time-separable quasi-linear von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions over the commodity space and that a good with constant marginal utility to each player (e.g.
money) can be freely transferred. In the terminology of Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998), this environment is5
be the proposer with probability  ∈ (01),
P
=1  =1 ,  ≡ {1}.W ed e n o t et h e
(random) identity of the proposer in any given period  by  and its realization by k.5
We assume that unlike the players in the game, researchers can only observe the vector
of states , but not the scalar noise . For generic random vectors 1 2,l e t(1|2) or
1|2 denote the distribution of 1 conditional on 2. Throughout the paper, we maintain
the following restriction on the transition of states.




For the rest of the paper, we use (0) to denote random vectors in the current and
the next period, respectively. Assumption CI requires that the dynamics between current
and subsequent states () and (0 0) be completely captured by the stochastic process
governing the transition of states that are observable to the researchers. This is a condition
commonly shared by a wide range of structural dynamic models in industrial organization
and labor economics (e.g. Rust (1987)).
The bargaining game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each period, players observe
() and know the identity of the proposer k. The proposer then chooses to either propose
an allocation in C () o rp a s sa n dl e tt h eg a m em o v et ot h en e x tp e r i o d . I fh ep r o p o s e s
an allocation, the other players respond by either accepting or rejecting the proposal. If
no proposal is oﬀered or the proposal is rejected by some player, the game moves to the
next period where new states (0 0) are realized and a new proposer k0 is selected with
probabilities . The procedure is then repeated with total surplus given by (0 0).T h i s
game continues until an allocation is proposed and unanimously accepted (if ever).
The structural parameters (|) are common knowledge among all players
(although they are not known to the researchers). Let  ≡ (  ) denote the information
available to the players at time . Given any initial realized information 0,a no u t c o m eo ft h e
bargaining game () consists of a stopping time  and a random -vector  (measurable
with respect to ) such that  ∈ C( ) is a feasible division of the cake in state ( )
if +∞,a n d =0if  =+ ∞. Given a realized sequence of information (0 1), 
deﬁned as a stochastic bargaining model with transferable utility. We consider more general environmnents
with non-transferable utilities in Section 6.
5The proposer identity  may be allowed to depend on the current states . As long as, once we
condition on ,  is independent of  and of past and future states, all our results generalize. We present
t h ec a s ew h e r e does not depend on  to simplify the exposition.6
is the period in which a proposal is accepted by all players, and  is the accepted proposal
when the state is ( ) and the identity of the proposer is . For a game starting with
initial states () and proposer k,a no u t c o m e() implies a von Neumann-Morgenstern
payoﬀ to player , [
|0 =( k)] = [
|0 = 0 = 0 = k],w h e r e is
the -th coordinate of .
A stationary outcome is such that there exists a measurable subset  of the support of
, and a measurable function  :  → R
+ such that (i)  6∈  for all  =0 1−1; (ii)
 ∈ ;a n d( i i i ) = (). That is, no allocation is implemented until some state and
proposer identity  =( k) ∈  is realized, in which case a feasible proposal (k) is
accepted by all players. Given property (iii), we let () ≡ [
()|0 = ] denote the
vector of individual von Neumann-Morgenstern payoﬀs given the initial state and proposer
identity in . I tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of stationary outcome that ()=() for
all  ∈  and ()=[
()|0 = ] for all  6∈ . Hence, a stationary outcome is
characterized by the triplet ().
A history up to time  is a ﬁnite sequence of realized states, identities of proposers, and
actions taken up to time .As t r a t e g yf o rp l a y e r speciﬁes a feasible action at every history
at which he must act. A strategy proﬁle is a measurable -tuple of strategies, one for each
player. At any history, a strategy proﬁle induces an outcome and hence a payoﬀ for each
player. A strategy proﬁle is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if, at every history, it
is a best response to itself. We refer to the outcome and payoﬀs induced by a subgame
perfect strategy proﬁle as a SPE outcome and SPE payoﬀs respectively. A strategy proﬁle
is stationary if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on the current state,
proposer identity, and oﬀer. A stationary SPE (SSPE) outcome and payoﬀsa r et h eo u t c o m e
and payoﬀs generated by a subgame perfect strategy proﬁle which is stationary.
The following lemma characterizes the players’ actions and outcomes in the unique SSPE
of the game. Let  : Ω → R1
+ denote the SSPE payoﬀ for player ,  =( 1) the
SSPE payoﬀ vector, and  =
P
=1  the SSPE total payoﬀ of all players in the bargaining
game. Let  denote the set of bounded measurable functions mapping from Ω to R.
Lemma 1 (Characterization of SSPE) Suppose CI holds. Then: (a)  ∈  is the unique
SSPE payoﬀ vector if and only if  = (),w h e r ef o ra n y and  =1 , the operator











for  = k (2)
(()) ≡ [(
0)|] for  6= k; (3)7
(b) the SSPE total payoﬀ  does not depend on ,a n ds o l v e s
()=m a x {()[(
0
0)|]}; (4)
and (c) an agreement is reached in states () if and only if () ≥ [(0 0)|].
The proof of Lemma 1 is based on results in Theorems 1-3 in Merlo and Wilson (1998).
A striking feature of the equilibrium of the canonical model of stochastic bargaining is that
the SSPE total payoﬀ and the occurrence of agreement in equilibrium only depend on the
current states (), but not on the identity of the proposer .T h i s i m p o r t a n t p r o p e r t y
of SSPE, known as the “separation principle”, is instrumental for some of our identiﬁcation
strategies below. In contrast, the individual SSPE payoﬀs ()
=1 do depend on the identity
of the proposer. In particular, only  = k can claim the additional “gains to the proposer”
()−[
P
=1 (0)|] in addition to his own continuation payoﬀ [(0)|], while all
other players just get their individual continuation payoﬀs.
The operator  we use to characterize the SSPE payoﬀsi sb a s e do nt h ef u n d a m e n t a l
observation that, if an agreement is reached in any period, the proposer may extract any
s u r p l u so v e rw h a tt h ep l a y e r so b t a i nb yd e l a y i n g agreement until the next period (i.e. their
equilibrium continuation payoﬀs). The separation principle implies that the identity of
the proposer aﬀects how the cake is allocated, but not the states in which it is allocated.
Furthermore, the gains from proposing are also independent of the identity of the proposer
and the characterization of the SSPE total payoﬀ is equivalent to the solution of the single
agent problem of deciding when to consume a stochastic cake. It follows that the SSPE total
payoﬀ maximizes the expected discounted size of the cake (i.e. the expected discounted total
surplus allocated among the players). The unique SSPE of the game (and hence any delay
in agreement) is therefore Pareto eﬃcient. The fact that a temporary delay in agreement is
a possible equilibrium outcome follows from the possibility that the discounted size of the
cake need not decline in every period. In particular, equilibrium delays occur in states where
t h ec a k ei s“ t o os m a l l ” :t h a ti s ,t h es u mo ft h ec o n t i n u a t i o np a y o ﬀs of all players (including
the proposer) exceeds the current size of the cake.
Econometricians are interested in recovering the underlying structure of the model, sum-
marized by the parameters (|) under assumption CI, using the distributions of
states, actions, proposers and allocations observed in the data from a large sample of bar-
gaining games. For each bargaining game in the data, we assume that researchers observe
the time to agreement and the history of the states ,b u tn o t.A l s o ,w ep o s i tt h a ta l lt h e
bargaining games observed in the data share the same transition of states and the same cake8
function  : Ω → R1
+, and all players follow SSPE strategies. In the next three sections
of the paper, we discuss the (nonparametric) identiﬁcation and estimation of the structure
under diﬀerent scenarios where the total surplus, the identity of the proposers and the agreed
proposals may or may not be reported in the data.
We consider three scenarios with increasing data limitations. In the ﬁrst scenario, re-
searchers have access to “complete data” and observe the identity of the proposer and the size
of the surplus in each period regardless of whether an agreement is reached. This represents
a useful benchmark to establish the extent to which model structures can be nonparametri-
cally identiﬁed and estimated under ideal circumstances. While not common, this scenario is
empirically relevant given the increased availability of bargaining data. For example, in the
context of negotiations over residential real estate transactions in England, Merlo, Ortalo-
Magne and Rust (2009) observe the entire history of oﬀers made by each potential buyer,
including the sequence of rejected oﬀers within individual negotiations.
In the second scenario, researchers have access to “incomplete data with censored cakes”
and observe the size of the cake only in the period when an agreement is reached. Also, the
identity of the proposer in any given period may or may not be observable. This is the most
common data scenario in the existing empirical literature. For example, in his empirical
analysis of the process of government formation in Italy, Merlo (1997) speciﬁe st h es i z eo f
the cake to be the expected duration of the government, which depends on the state of the
economy () as well as the political climate () while negotiations take place. In addition
to observing the duration of the negotiation, the sequence of proposers (or formateurs), and
the time-series of several macroeconomic variables during the negotiation for a sample of 47
bargaining episodes between 1947 and 1994, the data contain the durations of the coalition
governments that actually formed, but not the expected duration of proposed governments
that were rejected (see also Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003)). Similarly, Benjamin and
Wright (2008) and Ghosal, Miller and Thampanishvong (2010) use a stochastic bargaining
model to explain the length of delays in a sample of 90 sovereign debt restructurings during
1998-2005 and only observe the size of the “haircuts” that were agreed upon at the conclusion
of each negotiation. This data scenario also applies to the empirical study of corporate
bankruptcy reorganizations by Eraslan (2008). Since we use this application to illustrate
our methodology, we discuss it in more details in Section 4.3 below.
In the third scenario, researchers have access to “incomplete data with unobservable
cakes” and only observe the timing of agreement, but never observe the size of the cake or
the identity of the proposer. Since this scenario only requires minimal data, there are several9
possible applications where large data sets exist that only contain information about the
duration of negotiations. For example, in his empirical study of the time to the adoption of
standards by the Internet Engineering Task Force, which he models as a stochastic bargaining
problem, Simcoe (2008) uses a dataset containing the time between initial submission and
ﬁnal revision of 2,601 Internet Protocols between 1993 and 2003. Similarly, Diaz-Moreno
and Galdon (2000) estimate a stochastic model of collective bargaining using data on the
duration of 545 collective negotiations in Spain in the late 1980s.
In practice, data may contain cross-sectional variations in the number of players  and
their individual characteristics ,w h e r e ≡ (1 ) with  ∈ R for all  =1 .
Such proﬁles of individual characteristics may vary across bargaining episodes in the data,
but remain the same throughout any given negotiation. Of course, primitives (|)
may also depend on (). Since these individual characteristics are observable in the data
and ﬁx e do v e rt i m e ,o u ri d e n t i ﬁcation arguments throughout the paper should be interpreted
as conditional on (). We suppress dependence of the structural elements on the vector
() only for the sake of notational simplicity.
3C o m p l e t e D a t a
In this section, we discuss the empirical content of the canonical stochastic bargaining model
when researchers observe the complete history of (i)  and cake sizes  = ( ),b u tn o t
; (ii) whether an agreement is reached at time  (denoted by a dummy variable ); and (iii)
the proposer identity . Researchers also observe the agreed allocations (i.e.  ∈ C( ),
where  denotes the period when agreement occurs), but may not observe rejected proposals
(if any) in any other period. As we already pointed out, this observational environment is
both theoretically interesting and empirically relevant. We ﬁrst discuss testable restrictions
under our conditional independence assumption (CI) as well as monotonicity of the cake
function. Then, we show constructive identiﬁcation of the discount factor and the cake
function and propose consistent nonparametric estimators for both objects.
3.1 Preliminaries
Let 0 denote the distribution of the initial observable state 0 at the beginning of the
bargaining game. For the rest of the paper, we maintain a regularity condition that the
support of the observable states is the same for all periods (i.e. for all  and , Pr(+1 ∈ 
|  = )  0 for all  ⊆ Ω such that Pr(0 ∈ )  0). Under assumption CI,o n l y
 ≡ {|} remain to be identiﬁed, while the proposer-selection mechanism ,t h e10
transition of observed states  and the distribution of initial states 0 can be recovered
from the data. Hence, for identiﬁcation of ,w ec a nt r e a t and  as ﬁxed and known.
We say a joint distribution of the time to agreement , the accepted allocations  and
the history ( ) is rationalized by some  in a bargaining game (whose structure
satisﬁes CI) if this distribution arises in a SSPE given .D e ﬁne a feature Γ() as a mapping
from the space of parameters in  into that of the features (e.g. Γ() could be a subvector
or some functional of , such as the location (median) or the scale (variance) of  given ).
Deﬁnition 1 Let Θ denote the parameter space of  under certain restrictions. Two para-
meters 
0 ∈ Θ are observationally equivalent (denoted as 

˜ 
0) if they both rationalize the
same joint distribution of { }. A feature of the true parameter 0 is identiﬁed
if Γ()=Γ(0) for all 

˜ 0 in Θ.
Any feature of the true parameters Γ(0) that can be expressed in terms of observed
distributions of { } is identiﬁe d .N o t et h a ti d e n t i ﬁcation is deﬁned under CI
and any additional restrictions on  as captured in Θ.T h er o l eo fCI in deﬁning identiﬁcation
is to reduce the parameter space of interest to that of  ≡ {|}.F o ra n y ∈ Θ,l e t
(;) ≡ [(
0;)|] for  =1  and (;) ≡ [(
0
0;)|] (5)
denote respectively individual and total continuation payoﬀs under  in a SSPE, where 
and  are respectively the SSPE individual and total payoﬀs given by (2)-(4) in Lemma 1.
We maintain two additional restrictions on the parameter space.
MT (Monotonicity) Both () and |=() are strictly increasing in  for all .
ND (Non-degeneracy) For all , Pr{() − (;) ≥ 0 |  = } ∈ (01).
The monotonicity restriction MT ensures there exists a one-to-one mapping between cake
sizes and unobserved states given any .6 The non-degeneracy condition ND requires that
for any , there is enough variation in unobserved states so that an agreement may or may
not occur with positive probability. In other words, the discounted total continuation payoﬀ
is in the interior of the support of cake sizes for all observed states. This condition helps
to rule out uninteresting cases where agreement or non-agreement become a certainty once
 reaches some realized value . Since each player has a positive probability of being the
6This assumption is fairly restrictive and whether it is likely to hold or not depends on the structural
interpretation of  in the speciﬁc context of each application.11
proposer in any state, this assumption also implies that for each player  and state  there
is always a positive probability that an agreement is reached on someone else’s proposal.7
3.2 Testable restrictions
We derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the joint distribution of {   
} to be rationalized under CI by some  satisfying MT and ND.L e tΘ denote the
set of values of  that satisfy MT and ND.L e t() ≡ Pr{ =1 | = } and  ≡
Pr{ = } denote observable probabilities. For all  ∈ (01),l e t |() ≡ 
−1
 |() denote
the conditional quantiles of cake sizes. Deﬁne 
∗() ≡  |(1 − ()).
Lemma 2 (Testable Restrictions) A joint distribution of { } is rationalized
under CI by some  ∈ Θ if and only if: (i) for all  ≥ 0 and ( k),

¡




= +1(+1 +1|+1)(+1|) (6)
and (0 0 0|0)=0(0 0|0) for all 0; (ii) for all ,  |= is strictly increasing
and () ∈ (01); (iii)  
∗() for all and  ≥ 
∗(); (iv) there exists  ∈ (01)








and (v) there exist  functions (
∗
)
=1 such that  = 
∗



















The conditions in Lemma 2 arise naturally from properties of the SSPE and from the
assumptions CI, MT and ND. Condition (6) says that the distribution of cake sizes and
the probability of reaching an agreement do not depend on history once we condition on
contemporary observed states. They are also independent of the identity of the proposer in
any given period. These are direct implications of our conditional independence assumption
(given current observed states, the history of unobserved and past observed states are not
informative about the future), and the fact that the proposer-selection mechanism is inde-
pendent of the evolution of states. The conditional distribution of cake sizes is increasing,
as stated in condition (ii), because the cake function is monotone in the unobserved state,
whose conditional distribution is also increasing.
7The restriction in ND can be tested using the distribution of states, cakes and decisions.12
The separation principle implies that the occurrence of agreement in any given period
only depends on whether the cake size exceeds the discounted total continuation payoﬀ in
that period. Under CI, the latter is a function of current observed states alone. Under ND,
it must also lie in the interior of the conditional support of cake sizes. Therefore, condition
(iii) in Lemma 2 says that for any given observed state there is a single “threshold cake
size” beyond which agreement occurs. Hence, the threshold for any state can be recovered
as the appropriate conditional quantile of cake sizes. Condition (iv) also builds on a similar
argument to link the common discount factor to the distribution of observables. We elaborate
more on the intuition for this result following Proposition 1 below.
Finally, in any SSPE, a player who is not the proposer always accepts an allocation that
gives him his discounted individual continuation payoﬀ. Assumption ND implies that for
each player  and state  there is a positive chance that an agreement occurs when  is not the
proposer in state .C o n d i t i o n(v) simply relates each individual’s discounted continuation
payoﬀ to the allocation he accepts when someone else proposes in state .8
3.3 Identiﬁcation
We discuss identiﬁcation of {|} when the joint distribution of {  }
observed from the data is rationalizable (i.e. it satisﬁes the conditions in Lemma 2). Let
  denote the rationalizable joint distribution observed from the data. To clarify
the exposition in the rest of this section, let 0 ≡ {0 00
|} denote the true parameters
in the data-generating process and  ≡ {|} a generic set of parameters. Let −1()
denote the inverse function of () at  given . Recall that the proposer-selection mech-
anism  is independent from other states and is directly identiﬁed from observables.










(ii) A pair (|)

˜( 00
|) if and only if |(−1()) =  |() for all . (iii) If in




8Lemma 2 summarizes all the restrictions imposed by the model on the distribution of observables in
the complete data scenario. These restrictions can therefore be used to construct a test for the null that the
data is rationalized by the canonical stochastic sequential bargaining model. We leave the development of
such a test for future research.13
with 0
 normalized to a known distribution.
Identiﬁcation of 0 builds on two intuitive observations. First, under CI,  is not informa-
tive about next period’s total SSPE payoﬀ given . Hence, the true total continuation payoﬀ
(;0) does not depend on .U n d e r ND, 0(;0) lies in the interior of the support
of cake sizes, and MT implies it can be directly recovered as a conditional quantile 
∗()
as in Lemma 2. Second, changing variables between  and  under MT helps to relate the







where the preﬁx “quasi-” is due to the fact that (00
|) only enters through the observed
distribution of cake sizes  | it implies. Substituting 
∗() in place of 0(;0) in the
quasi-structural form gives (9).
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 states that a generic pair (|) is observationally equivalent
to the true parameters if and only if it implies the same cake distribution  | as observed in
the data-generating process. This is fairly intuitive because the separation principle implies
that agreements do not depend on the identity of the proposer, and proposer identities evolve
independently of the other state variables. It follows from (ii) that the cake function and
the distribution of the unobserved state are non-identiﬁed because they cannot be jointly
identiﬁed from the observed cake distribution  | alone.
Some normalization is required for recovering .W h e n is independent of , following
Matzkin (2003) we could have normalized 0(¯ )= for some ¯  and recovered 0
 ()
and 0() as  |¯ () and  |( |¯ ()), respectively. Instead, we propose an alternative
normalization in (iii) of Proposition 1 that sets 0
 to a known distribution (such as a
uniform on [01]). This allows us to recover 0() as  |(0
 ()). On the other hand,
if the distribution of the unobserved state depends on , such a normalization would not
be innocuous because the chosen form of | can aﬀect predictions in some counterfactual
analyses.9
3.4 Consistent estimation
We construct a multi-step nonparametric estimator for the discount factor 0 by plugging in
sample analogs in the identiﬁcation arguments presented above. We show consistency of the
9See Appendix B for details. To our knowledge, the choice of innocuous normalizations in this case
r e m a i n sa no p e nq u e s t i o n .14
estimator when the support of  is ﬁnite.10 The data contains  independent bargaining
games, each indexed by . For a game ,l e t denote the number of bargaining periods
(which are indexed by ) observed in the data. It is possible that, for some games, players may







=1(). The estimation procedure is as follows. First, estimate the
probabilities of agreement and the conditional distribution of cake sizes as:
ˆ () ≡
P




ˆ  |(|) ≡
P




Next, estimate the discounted ex ante total continuation payoﬀs 0(;0) as:
ˆ () ≡ argmin∈R1
h
ˆ  |(|) − ˆ ()
i2
 (14)
Third, estimate the conditional expectation of total payoﬀs 0() ≡ [max{ 0(;0)}
|  = ] as
ˆ () ≡
P




Fourth, estimate the transition of observed states 0| as ˆ 0| ≡
¡
Σ¯ ∈Ω¯ |
¢−1 0|,w h e r e
0| denotes the number of transitions from state  to 0 observed in the data. Let  ≡
P
1{ = } and  ≡
¡P
¯ ∈Ω ¯ 















→ denote convergence in probability and for a generic vector ,l e tN() be an -
neighborhood around .
Proposition 2 Suppose CI, MT and ND hold; [0()| = ]  0 for all ;a n dt h e r e
exists 0 such that sup∈N(∗(;0)) |[max{0()}| = ]|  ∞.T h e nˆ 

→ 0.
To estimate 0, we can normalize 0
 to (01) and estimate 0() by ˆ () ≡
ˆ  |=(Φ()) where Φ is the standard normal distribution. The consistency of ˆ  holds
under standard regularity conditions for nonparametric quantile estimators.
10We can generalize our estimator to allow for mixed discrete and continuous covariates by using kernel
smoothing. This generalization is however omitted to economize on space.15
4 Incomplete Data with Censored Cakes
In this section, we discuss nonparametric identiﬁcation and estimation of the canonical sto-
chastic bargaining model when the cake size is only observed in the event of an agreement.
As we pointed out above this is the predominant data scenario in empirical applications. In
this scenario, conditional on any observed state, the distribution of cake sizes is censored at
the discounted total continuation payoﬀ. In addition, researchers may or may not observe
the identity of the proposer in any given period. We show that the common discount factor
can still be recovered from the distribution of observables under our conditional indepen-
dence assumption (CI). Furthermore, we show that if the total surplus is additively separable
in observed and unobserved states, and if the distribution of the unobserved state satisﬁes
some exclusion restrictions, then the cake function can be identiﬁed. We construct consistent
nonparametric estimators for the discount factor and the cake function and illustrate our
methodology by performing an actual estimation of a simple stochastic bargaining model of
corporate bankruptcy reorganization. In what follows, we drop subscripts and superscripts
0 from the true parameters in the data-generating process to simplify notation.
4.1 Identiﬁcation
For generic random vectors 1 2,l e t
2|1 denote the -quantile of 2 conditional on 1.
Throughout this section, we maintain the following restrictions on the model structure.
AS (Additive separability) ()=() −  for all ,w h e r e() is bounded over Ω.
RS (Rich support)  has positive densities with respect to the Lebesgue measure over R1.
MI (Median independence) 05
| =0for all  ∈ Ω.
ER (Exclusion restrictions)  =( ) and  is independent of  conditional on .
SV (Suﬃcient variation) Pr( ∈ Ω
+
|)  0 for all ,w h e r eΩ
+
 ≡ { : () ≥ ()}.
Under additive separability of the cake function (AS), the equilibrium characterization
in Lemma 1 implies that () − () −  is the diﬀerence between the proposer’s con-
temporary payoﬀ should he decide to oﬀer the other players their continuation values and
his own continuation value. Hereinafter, we refer to () − () −  as the “potential
proposer gains” and max{()−()−0} as the “actual proposer gains” that accrue
to the proposer when agreements occur. Under median independence of the unobserved state
(MI), ()−() is the median of the potential proposer gains given .T h er i c hs u p p o r t
assumption (RS) requires the unobserved state  to be distributed with a large support over16
R1. This requirement guarantees that there is a positive probability that the potential pro-
poser gains are strictly greater than zero in any observed state. Hence, in spite of censoring,
at least some high quantile of cake sizes is observable in each state.11
The exclusion restrictions (ER) imply that a subvector of observed states  is indepen-
dent of the noise in the potential proposer gains  conditional on the remaining observed
states . These restrictions may arise naturally if the noise unobserved by researchers
aﬀects not only the total surplus but also a subset of the observed state variables. The
suﬃcient variation condition (SV) ensures that for any  t h e r ei sa l w a y se n o u g hv a r i a t i o n
in the excluded states  so that () leads to strictly positive proposer gains, and hence
agreements, with over 50% chance. We discuss the practical implications of assumptions ER
and SV in the context of an empirical application in Section 4.3 below.
Proposition 3 establishes identiﬁcation of the discount factor and the cake function.12 For
any bounded function  deﬁned over Ω,l e t◦() ≡
R
max{(0)−0(0)}0|00|.
For any ,l e t˜ () denote the lower bound of the support of cake sizes  under agreement
( =1 ). Note that even when the observed distribution of cake sizes is censored, the con-
ditional median of cake sizes is identiﬁed for all observed states where the probability of
agreement is greater than one half. In particular, for any such state ,i fw ed e ﬁne   to be
equal to the observed cake size whenever an agreement occurs and to ˜ () when it does not
(i.e.   ≡  +( 1− ) ˜ ()), then 05
 | = 05
 |.
Proposition 3 Suppose CI, AS, RS, MI, ER and SV hold, and  is a self-map over the










for all  ∈ Ω; (ii)  ∈ Ω
+
 if and only if () ≥ 1
2; (iii) for any  ∈ Ω
+





and (iv) for any  =(  ) 6∈ Ω
+
, () is identiﬁed as:
()=

 |=1 + 
05
 |˜  − 
0
 |=1˜ 
11The restriction that the support of  is unbounded in R1 is stronger than necessary. Identiﬁcation only
requires that conditional on all  ∈ Ω the support of  is large enough to induce positive gains to the
proposer (and therefore an agreement) with positive probability. However, imposing the stronger condition
simpliﬁes the exposition.
12Our identiﬁcation arguments extend immediately to cases where condition ER holds after further con-
ditioning on observable instruments , which may or may not enter the cake function.17
for any  ∈ (01) and ˜  ≡ ( ˜ ) ∈ Ω
+
,w h e r e0 =1− (1 − )
()
(˜ ).
Proof of Proposition 3. Proof of (i) and (ii). Because  is a self-map, the total continuation
payoﬀs and the median potential proposer gains are bounded. Then AS and RS imply () ≡
Pr{ ≤ ()−()|} ∈ (01) for all . The discounted total continuation payoﬀs ()




 +( 1− )()|
It then follows the discount factor is (over-)identiﬁed as in part (i) for all  ∈ Ω. Because
Lemma 1 suggests Pr{ =1 |} =P r { ≤ () − ()|},p a r t(ii) follows from RS.
P r o o fo f( i i i ) .For any  ∈ Ω and  ∈ (01),d e ﬁne () ≡ 1 − ()+().B yt h e
Law of Total Probability, 
 |=1 = 
()
 | for all (). For any  ∈ Ω
+
,i n v e r t at 1
2 to
get −1




 |=1 = 
05
 | = () (18)
for all  in Ω
+
, where the second equality follows from AS and MI.
P r o o fo f( i v ) .Recall that by construction, ()  1 − () for all  ∈ (01) and


 |=1 = 
()
 | = () − 
1−()
| (19)
for all  ∈ Ω (including  6∈ Ω
+
). Consider any  6∈ Ω
+
. Because 
 |=1 is directly
identiﬁed, () will be identiﬁed if 
1−()
| can be recovered from observed distributions.
Suppose  consists of ( ). Condition SV implies for all  that ˜  ≡ ( ˜ ) ∈ Ω
+
 must
exist with positive probability. And ER implies 
|˜  = 
| = 
| for any  ∈ (01) and
any such ˜ .R e c a l l0 is deﬁned as

0( ˜ ;) ≡ 1 − (1 − )
()
(˜ ) (20)
for any such ˜  and  ∈ (01).N o t e 0  1,b e c a u s e()  1
2 ≤ (˜ ) by deﬁnition of
Ω
+







(˜ ) − 0
 |=1˜  where the ﬁrst and second equalities follow from ER and the third follows
from (19). Finally, note 0
 |=1˜  is directly identiﬁed and (˜ ) is recovered as 05
 |˜  because
˜  is chosen from Ω
+
. Therefore for any  =(  ) 6∈ Ω
+









 |=1 + 
05
 |˜  − 
0
 |=1˜  (21)18
for any ˜  =(  ˜ ) ∈ Ω
+
 and  ∈ (01). 
The results in Proposition 3 are intuitive. Part (i) identiﬁes the discount factor using a
similar argument to the one in Proposition 1. The only diﬀerence is that when the cakes are
censored and are only observed when agreement occurs, the discounted total continuation
payoﬀ  in each state is identiﬁed as the lower bound of the support of observed cakes
in that state. Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from the observation that for states where the
probability of reaching an agreement is greater than one half ( ∈ Ω
+
), the conditional
median of cake sizes is directly observable.13 This is a direct implication of the conditional
median independence (MI) assumption.
The exclusion restriction (ER)a n dt h ea s s u m p t i o no fs u ﬃcient variation in excluded
states (SV) are instrumental for identifying median cake sizes conditional on states where
the probability of reaching an agreement is less than one half ( ∈ Ω
+
)i np a r t(iv).T h e
reasoning behind the proof is as follows. Even for any  ≡ ( ) 6∈ Ω
+
, additive separability
of the cake function (AS) and rich support of unobserved states (RS) imply the conditional
-quantile of uncensored cake sizes 

 | = () − 
1−
| can be recovered for some  close
enough to 1. Hence, identiﬁcation of () only hinges on identiﬁcation of 
1−





|˜  for any ˜  =(  ˜ ). The role of SV is to ensure there exists such a ˜  ∈ Ω
+
,
so that the latter quantile can be recovered as 
1−
|˜  = (˜ ) − 

 |˜  = 05
 |˜  − 

 |˜ .14 The
regularity condition in Proposition 3 that  is a self-map ensures that the total continuation
payoﬀs are bounded. This requirement is natural and sensible in most applications.
4.2 Consistent estimation
As in Section 3.4, our multi-step estimation procedure consists of plugging in sample analogs
in the identiﬁcation arguments presented above. Also, we only construct nonparametric
estimators for the case with a ﬁnite Ω for expositional simplicity. The ﬁrst step is to
estimate the total continuation payoﬀ as well as the discount factor .F o r e a c h  ∈ Ω,
estimate () by:
ˆ I() ≡ inf{ :  =  =1 } (22)
where subscripts I are used here to distinguish estimators in the case of incomplete data
with censored cakes from the ones in the previous section. Under appropriate regularity
13Our argument can be extended to show identiﬁcation under any general conditional quantile indepen-
dence (i.e. 
| = ∗ for all  ∈ Ω,w h e r e ∈ (01) and ∗ ∈ R1 are known constants).
14Chen, Dahl and Khan (2005) use a similar argument to nonparametrically identify a censored regression
with an independent error term that has multiplicative heterogeneity.19
conditions, ˆ I()











The estimator for the discount factor ˆ I is deﬁned similarly to (16), but with ˆ  and ˆ 
replaced by ˆ I and ˆ I. Arguments similar to those in Section 3.4 apply to show that
ˆ I

→  under appropriate conditions.
The proof of identiﬁcation of the cake function in Proposition 3 holds for any  ∈ (01)
and appropriately chosen ˜ . Therefore the cake function  is over-identiﬁed. We propose
an estimator of () for all  ≡ ( ) ∈ Ω that exploits such an over-identiﬁcation by
averaging over multiple pairs of ( ˜ )’s. First, estimate Ω
+
 by the set of ’s for which the
null hypothesis 0 : () ≥ 12 cannot be rejected at some signiﬁcance level .T h a ti s ,
ˆ Ω
+






where 1− denotes the (1−)-quantile of the standard normal distribution and  is deﬁned
as in Section 3.4.15 Then, for any  ∈ ˆ Ω
+
, estimate ()=05
 | by the median of the
empirical analog of   deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n4 . 1 :t h a ti s ,ˆ () ≡ ˆ 05
 |.16
For any  6∈ ˆ Ω
+
, estimate () as follows. First, specify an arbitrary  ∈ (01) and
estimate 
 |=1 by the conditional empirical -quantile of  under agreement in state 
(denoted by ˆ 
 |=1). This is done by inverting the empirical distribution of  conditional
on  =1and  at . Second, select some ˜  ≡ (˜  ˜ ) such that ˜  =  and ˜  ∈ ˆ Ω
+
.F o r
any such pair ( ˜ ),e s t i m a t e0 by ˆ 
0 =1− (1 − )ˆ ()ˆ (˜ ), and then estimate 0
 |=1˜ 
by ˆ ˆ 0
 |=1˜ .D e ﬁne an estimator for () associated with this pair of ( ˜ ) as
ˆ (;˜ ) ≡ ˆ 

 |=1 + ˆ 
05
 |˜  − ˆ 
ˆ 0
 |=1˜  (24)
Finally, repeat the previous two steps to construct estimators for other ’s and ˜ ’s, and take
the average of these estimators. Speciﬁcally, for any  6∈ ˆ Ω
+
,d e ﬁne













where A is the set of arbitrarily chosen  (with its cardinality denoted by #(A)). Proposition
4 proves point-wise consistency of ˆ () for all  ∈ Ω under the following additional regularity
conditions:
15Alternatively, we could use ˆ Ω
+
 ≡ { ∈ Ω :ˆ () ≥ 1
2}.
16The empirical analog of   is deﬁned as  
 ≡  +( 1− )
³P
∈Ω
ˆ I()1{ = }
´
20
RG (Regularity) (i) The distribution  |=1 is absolutely continuous and has positive
density  |=1 with respect to the Lebesgue measure over its conditional support; (ii) for
all  and  ∈ (01),t h e r ee x i s t s0 such that  |=1 is bounded below by some positive
constant  over the -neighborhood around the quantile 
 |=1, N(
 |=1),w h e r eb o t h
 and  may depend on  and ; and (iii) Pr{()=1
2} =0 .
Proposition 4 Suppose CI, AS, RS, MI, ER, SV and RG hold. Then ˆ ()

→ () for all
 ∈ Ω.
4.3 An application: corporate bankruptcy reorganization
In this section, we illustrate our methodology by performing nonparametric estimation of a
simple model of corporate bankruptcy reorganization in the United States. When a company
ﬁles for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States, it keeps operating while its claimants
(which include both debt-holders and equity-holders) negotiate over a plan to reorganize
the ﬁrm as an alternative to its liquidation. In particular, the claimants bargain over the
allocation of the company’s reorganization val u ea f t e rt h ec o m p a n ye m e r g e sf r o mb a n k r u p t c y .
For this event to occur, all classes of creditors (which include secured and unsecured creditors
as well as equity-holders) have to agree on a plan to restructure the bankrupt ﬁrm. Clearly,
the potential value from reorganizing the company can vary during the negotiating period
due to ﬂuctuations in aggregate conditions (such as, for example, ﬂuctuations in interest
rates), or changes in industry- and ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o n d i t i o n st h a ta r er e ﬂected, for example,
in the movement of stock prices. The reorganization value may also depend on private
information revealed to the claimants while negotiations take place, but not observable by
others. Hence, this situation represents a natural application of the stochastic bargaining
framework.
Our goal here is not to provide a comprehensive empirical study of corporate bankruptcy
reorganizations in the U.S., for which we refer the reader to Eraslan (2008).17 More simply,
our aim is to illustrate the feasibility of our nonparametric identiﬁcation and estimation
strategies in the context of a real application. The U.S. Corporate Bankruptcy Data (UCBD)
collected by Eraslan (2008) contains information on 128 large, publicly held ﬁrms that ﬁled
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 1990 and 1997, and had a conﬁrmed reorganization plan
17Eraslan (2008) speciﬁes a bargaining model of corporate bankruptcy reorganization that explicitely
incorporates the role of the court in Chapter 11 bankruptcies and the possibility that a case is converted
to Chapter 7. She estimates the model parametrically using a novel data set she collected. She then uses
the estimated structural model to conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the liquidation values of
bankrupt ﬁrms that successfully reorganize and to assess the consequences of a mandatory liquidation policy.21
by the end of 2000. In addition to the beginning and end dates of the negotiations, and the
dollar values of the total claims of the creditors at the time of ﬁling, for 77 ﬁrms the data also
contain their reorganization values and the agreed upon allocations among their claimants.
However, since when a ﬁrm ﬁles for Chapter 11 its stock is suspended from trading until
the ﬁrm emerges from bankruptcy, the potential reorganization value of a ﬁrm during the
negotiation over its reorganization is not publicly observable. Hence, this situation ﬁts the
incomplete data scenario with censored cakes. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the
77 bargaining episodes we use in our analysis.18
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
mean std. dev. median
Duration (days) 48933 50537 360
Firm value (million $) 65813 97187 39474
Total claims (million $) 95624 135310 46636
Firm value/Total claims 078 045 072
To capture the evolution of state variables that may aﬀect the value of a ﬁrm while
the claimants bargain over its reorganization, we supplement the UCBD with time-series
data on interest rates of 3-month Treasury bills from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) and industry stock price indices from COMPUSTAT over the relevant time periods.
For each ﬁrm in the data, we use its industry classiﬁcation deﬁned by the Global Industry
Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) to collect the time-series of the stock price index pertaining to
the ﬁrm’s industry between the time it ﬁles from Chapter 11 and the time its reorganization
plan is conﬁrmed.19
Given the relatively small size of the sample, it would not be feasible to estimate nonpara-
metrically a bargaining model of corporate bankruptcy reorganizations with heterogeneous
ﬁrms and a large state space. For this reason, we abstract from ﬁrm- and industry-level
heterogeneity across bargaining episodes and estimate our model using a simple structure
for the state space. Using the notation of the canonical model of stochastic sequential bar-
18For a detailed description of the dataset see Eraslan (2008).
19To express stock prices in real terms, we divide them by the consumer price index obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. To match each ﬁrm in the UCBD with its industry classiﬁcation code in GICS
we use standard SIC codes for industry classiﬁcations which are provided in the UCBD. For each of the
six observations in the UCBD that do not have an SIC code, we assign a GICS classiﬁcation based on the
description of the business scope contained in the company’s website.22
gaining presented in Section 2, we take a period  to be six months.20 We normalize the
ﬁrms’ reorganization values by dividing them by the total claims of all equity-holders and
debt-holders (secured and unsecured) at the beginning of the negotiations and deﬁne the
cake ()− to be the normalized value, where  is median-independent of .21 The observ-
able states,  =
¡
¢
,a r et h eﬂuctuations in industry stock price indices ()a n di n
the interest rate (). To simplify the analysis, we focus on changes in the stock prices and
the interest rate, and deﬁne states in terms of changes relative to the previous period. In
particular, the state space has four possible values: 1 ≡ (Stock ↑ , Interest ↑), 2 ≡ (Stock
↑ , Interest ↓), 3 ≡ (Stock ↓ , Interest ↑)a n d4 ≡ (Stock ↓ , Interest ↓).22 The state un-
observable to the econometricians, , contains idiosyncratic information about a ﬁrm’s value
that is only observed by the claimants. We apply the estimators described in Section 4.2 to
recover the discount factor  and the cake function (). In particular, we aim at inferring
the conditional medians of the potential normalized reorganization values given ﬂuctuations
in the observable states.
Given our deﬁnition of states, we can justify the two main identifying restrictions we
introduced in Section 4.1: exclusion restrictions (ER)a n ds u ﬃcient variation (SV). Speciﬁ-
cally, unobserved noises which aﬀect a ﬁrm’s reorganization value are more likely to pertain
to ﬁrm-level rather than aggregate information. Once movements in stock prices are con-
trolled for, it is plausible to assume that such information is orthogonal to macroeconomic
conditions such as the interest rate. On the other hand, ﬂuctuations in interest rates af-
fect the cost of capital on the market, and can have a substantial impact on how claimants
forecast the reorganization values. Table 2 reports the sample probability of reaching an
agreement in each of the four possible states and results from one-sided tests for the simple
null hypothesis 0: Pr(agreement|) ≥ 12. Our test in Table 2 shows some evidence that
changes in the interest rate can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on median normalized reorganization
values, regardless of movements in stock prices. The last column in Table 2 also suggests
20As pointed out by Eraslan (2008), proposals to restructure a bankrupt ﬁrm are complex objects that take
time to formulate and implement. For example, each class of creditors has to separately vote on a proposed
plan before it can be conﬁrmed. When a period is equal to six months, our data contains observations on
204 bargaining periods across all bargaining episodes.
21As Table 1 shows, the ﬁrms in the sample diﬀer considerably in their realized reorganization values.
Such diﬀerences may be ascribed to industry- or ﬁrm-level factors that are not captured by our deﬁnition of
states. The normalization we adopt is meant to partially account for such heterogeneities across bargaining
episodes.
22A ↑ indicates that the value of the variable in the current period is strictly larger than its value in the
previous period. A possible justiﬁcation for this simpliﬁcation is that claimants are often more concerned
about the momentum of these variables, which tend to be more predictive about future changes.23
that we could not reject the null that conditional agreement probabilities are above 50% for
states 1 and 3. This observation is consistent with our identifying condition in SV,w h i c h
requires that changes in interest rates be conditionally independent from other unobserved
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors given the changes in stock prices.
Table 2: Summary statistics for states and agreements
States () ˆ () p-value
1 ≡ (Stock ↑ , Interest ↑) 0.49 0.44
2 ≡ (Stock ↑ , Interest ↓) 0.28 0.00
3 ≡ (Stock ↓ , Interest ↑) 0.56 0.76
4 ≡ (Stock ↓ , Interest ↓) 0.32 0.01
Notes: ˆ () are sample probabilities for reaching an agreement in state  (e.g. ˆ (4)=0 32
means that among all bargaining periods in the data when the state is 4,i n32% of the cases
claimants are observed to reach an agreement. The p-value is based on a one-sided test for
the null 0:() ≥ 12.)
In our estimation, we use ˆ Ω
+
 = {1 3}. Table 3 reports point estimates and 90%
conﬁdence intervals for () (i.e. conditional medians) for each possible state .T h ep o i n t
estimate of  is 0.53, with a 90% conﬁdence interval of [0.52, 0.70].23 The conﬁdence intervals
are constructed by using a bootstrap resampling method as follows. We construct 500
bootstrap samples by drawing from our estimation data with replacement. We then calculate
our estimates as described in Section 4.2 for each one of the bootstrap samples. The 90%
conﬁdence intervals for  and () are then constructed by pairing the 5th and the 95th
percentile of all point estimates from the 500 bootstrap samples.
Table 3: Estimates and conﬁdence intervals for median cakes
States () ˆ () 90%-C.I. for ()
1 ≡ (stock ↑ ,i n t e r e s t↑) 0.38 [0.31 , 0.53]
2 ≡ (stock ↑ ,i n t e r e s t↓) 0.26 [0.14 , 0.29]
3 ≡ (stock ↓ ,i n t e r e s t↑) 0.33 [0.26 , 0.65]
4 ≡ (stock ↓ ,i n t e r e s t↓) 0.17 [0.03 , 0.43]
23While this estimate may seem low, the six-month discount factor in this setting also incorporates the
risk of liquidation, which we do not model explicitly here.24
The point estimates in Table 3 suggest that, for a given direction of changes in the interest
rate, the median of the normalized reorganization values is higher if stock prices have gone
up. This is consistent with the intuition that an upward trend in stock prices lead to more
optimistic expectations for reorganization values by the claimants. On the other hand, for
a ﬁxed direction of changes in stock prices, the median reorganization value is higher as
the interest rate increases. This may be attributed to the fact that a higher interest rate
translates into higher costs of borrowing on capital markets. Thus, if claimants are short of
cash, they may ﬁnd it appealing to realize the reorganization values earlier so as to avoid
the higher interests.
Table 4 reports bootstrap conﬁdence intervals for diﬀerences in median cake sizes under
various states. At the 90% level, an increase in stock prices does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the size of the cake, regardless of the ﬂuctuations in the interest rate. On the other hand,
increasing interest rates can lead to a signiﬁcantly higher chance for claimants to reach an
agreement if stock prices have gone up from the previous period. Taken together, these
patterns seem to suggest that movements in the interest rate have a more pronounced eﬀect
on the probability of reaching agreements than changes in stock prices.
Table 4: Conﬁdence intervals for diﬀerence in cakes
∆ 90%-C.I. for ∆
(1) − (3) [-0.31 , 0.20]
(2) − (4) [-0.21 , 0.23]
(1) − (2) [0.05 , 0.38]
(3) − (4) [-0.13 , 0.59]
5 Incomplete Data with Unobserved Cakes
We now discuss nonparametric identiﬁcation of the canonical stochastic bargaining model in
the scenario with the least data. In particular, we consider the case where researchers only
observe the duration of the negotiation and the evolution of states  in each bargaining
episode in the data, but never observe the size of the cake or the identity of the proposer.
As we pointed out in Section 2, there exist several large data sets pertaining to bargaining
situations which only record the beginning and end dates of negotiations.24
24In addition to the data used by Diaz-Moreno and Galdon (2000) and Simcoe (2008) which we already
mentioned, there are many instances of legal disputes that are settled out of court where the beginning and25
The deﬁnition of observational equivalence of parameters needs to be modiﬁed to ﬁtt h i s
scenario. Let | denote the probability of agreement in state . A vector of parameters is
observationally equivalent to the truth in the data-generating process if it implies the same
| as that observed in the data for all  ∈ Ω.T h ed e ﬁnition of identiﬁcation of features
of the true parameters remains instead the same as in Section 3.
O u rs t a r t i n gp o i n tf o ra n a l y z i n gi d e n t i ﬁcation is that the model is correctly speciﬁed
under our conditional independence assumption (CI)f o rs o m e(|). This means that
the distribution of agreements observed necessarily satisﬁes restrictions implied by the model
assumptions (i.e. 00| = 0|00|) .A si nt h ec a s eo fi n c o m p l e t ed a t aw i t hc e n s o r e d
cakes analyzed in Section 4, throughout this section we maintain the assumption that the cake
function is additively separable (AS): ()=()−.W eﬁrst show identiﬁcation of ()
w h e nt h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r and the distribution | are known to researchers.25 We then
consider the case where | is not known and show partial identiﬁcation of counterfactual
outcomes when the transition of states or the cake functions are changed.
Proposition 5 Suppose CI and AS hold and () ∈ (01) for all .I f  and | are
known, then () is identiﬁed for all .
The result in Proposition 5 builds on an earlier ﬁnding by Berry and Tamer (2006) on the
identiﬁcation of optimal stopping models. The proof of Proposition 5 exploits the separation
principle in Lemma 1: An agreement occurs if and only if the total surplus exceeds the total
continuation payoﬀ in a SSPE, which has the same characterization as the continuation
value in a single-agent optimal stopping problem. Hence, the arguments in Berry and Tamer
(2006) can be applied here to show identiﬁcation of .26
The assumption that the unobserved state distribution | is known is less restrictive
than it appears. Given AS and CI, the scale and location of the cake function cannot be
identiﬁed jointly. If | is known a priori to belong to any family of distributions completely
characterized by location and scale parameters (e.g. normal or logistic), then specifying the
scale and location of | in estimation only serves as a normalization.
end dates of the disputes are recorded, but the details of the negotiations or the terms of the settlements are
not disclosed.
25The assumption that the discount factor  is known to researchers can be justiﬁed in situations where
it can be directly recovered from the data. This is typically the case in macroeconomic applications where
the discount factor is speciﬁed as  ≡ 1(1 + ) where  is the interest rate.
26If  is not known, their arguments can also be extended to show that  can be identiﬁed as long as
| is known for all  and the cake function is known for some value of .26
However, in practice it is often the case that researchers do not know a priori whether
the distribution of unobserved states belongs to a location-scale family. In this case, mis-
specifying | can lead to incorrect predictions of outcomes (i.e. probabilities of agreements
conditional on observable states) under hypothetical changes in the transition of states or in
the cake function. On the other hand, economic theory often implies that the cake function or
the unobserved state distribution must satisfy certain shape or stochastic restrictions (such
as monotonicity of  or independence of  from ). Such conditions help restrict counterfac-
tual outcomes to a subset that is consistent with model restrictions and outcomes observed
in the data-generating process. We refer to this set as the identiﬁed set of counterfactual
outcomes (ISCO).
For the rest of this section, we restrict  to be independent of , and the support of  to
be ﬁnite (i.e. Ω ≡ {1}).27 It is therefore convenient to introduce vector notation.
Let the cake function be denoted by a -vector  with coordinates  ≡ (),a n dt h e
transition of observable states be denoted by a  ×  transition matrix  with entries
 ≡ Pr(0 = | = ),  =1 . The observed outcome in a SSPE is then
summarized by the -vector of conditional agreement probabilities  ≡ ((1)()).
Also, we focus on shape restrictions on the cake function that can be represented as a system
of linear inequalities on ,   0,w h e r e is a known matrix with as many rows as the
number of restrictions. For example, partial or complete rankings of the sizes of the cake
in diﬀerent states, as well as monotonicity, additive separability, or super-modularity of the
cake function in a subvector of  can all be expressed as linear restrictions on .
We propose simple algorithms for recovering the ISCO under two types of hypothetical
changes in the model structure: the transition between states is changed from  to ˜ 
while  remain unchanged; or the cake function is changed from  to ˜  ≡ , while
 remain unchanged. (Here,  is a known diagonal matrix with positive diagonal
elements denoting percentage changes in the cake sizes in diﬀerent states.) By deﬁnition,
the task of recovering the ISCO under a given set of model restrictions amounts to ﬁnding
all counterfactual outcomes ˜  ∈ (01) such that both ˜  and the outcomes observed from
the data-generating process  are jointly implied in a SSPE by the same structure 
satisfying these restrictions.
Our algorithm ﬁnds all such ˜ ’s by exploiting two simple observations about the structural
link between model primitives and implied outcomes. First, the characterization of SSPE
27The case of discretized state spaces is particularly important in the empirical literature on structural
estimation. This assumption also simpliﬁes our exposition of the characterization of the ISCO. We conjecture
that there is a continuous analog for our partial identiﬁcation arguments below.27
consists of a system of equalities relating the vector of outcomes to the cake function 
and certain nuisance parameters of  (which include quantiles and truncated expectations
of ). Second, the shape restrictions on  and the independence between  and  can be
formulated respectively as inequalities restricting  and these nuisance parameters. (For
example, the unknown quantiles −1
 () m u s tb er a n k e di nt h es a m eo r d e ra s;t h a t
is, ()  () if and only if −1
 (())  −1
 (()).) This system of equalities and
inequalities is linear in the unknown structural elements (i.e.  and nuisance parameters of
), and the vector of implied outcomes enters the system through the matrix of coeﬃcients.
A sar e s u l t ,av e c t o r˜  belongs to the ISCO if and only if it is such that the linear system
admits solutions in  and nuisance parameters of  given .
We formalize this idea in Proposition 6 below. For a generic vector ,l e t and ()
denote its -th coordinate and its -th smallest coordinate, respectively. Let 0 be an
arbitrary positive constant chosen to normalize the scale of  and .
Proposition 6 Suppose CI and AS hold;  satisﬁes the shape restrictions   0;  is
independent from ;  is known; and  ∈ (01) is the vector of outcomes observed form
the data-generating process. Then: (i) a vector ˜  is in the ISCO under the counterfactual
transition of states ˜  if and only if, for all  =1 2 +1and  =1 2,t h e r ee x i s t
( ˜ ) ∈ R2 and (Φ ˜ Φ) ∈ R2
++ that satisfy:

 + ( − )
−1
Φ = ˜ 
 + ( −  ˜ )









¯  ≤ ¯  ⇔ ¯  ≤ ¯  (28)
¯ ()( ¯ 

(+1) − ¯ 

()) ≤ ¯ 
Φ






(+1) − ¯ 

()) (29)
where ¯  ≡
¡
 ˜  1
2
¢








; and (ii) the characterization
of the ISCO under the counterfactual cake function ˜  is the same as in part (i), except that
(26) is replaced by:
˜ 









Proposition 6 implies that recovering the ISCO’s under both types of counterfactual
changes is equivalent to ﬁnding all ˜ ’s such that the linear systems (26)-(30) admit solutions.
Standard linear programming algorithms can then be used to ﬁnd such ˜ ’s.28
28In an earlier version of the paper, we presented a simple numerical example with a low-dimension state28
Conditions (26)-(29) all have intuitive interpretations. Equation (26) derives from the
requirement that the cake function remains unchanged as the transition of states shifts from
 to ˜  in the ﬁrst type of counterfactual exercises. To see this, let  Π and Φ denote
-vectors with coordinates  ≡ −1
 (), Π ≡ () and Φ ≡
R
max{−0},
respectively.29 The SSPE outcome from the data-generating process is characterized by
 =  − Π,w h e r eΠ = (Φ + Π). Thus, the cake function must be related to  as
follows:
 =  + ( − )
−1Φ (31)
With  unchanged but  replaced by ˜ , we can derive a similar structural equation
 = ˜ +(− ˜ )−1 ˜ ˜ Φ,w h e r e ˜  ˜ Φ are deﬁned as Φ but with  replaced by ˜  (the implied
SSPE outcome under ˜ ). This means (26) must hold with ( ˜  Φ ˜ Φ)=(  ˜ Φ ˜ Φ),
because the cake function remains the same both in the data-generating process and the
counterfactual context under ˜ . Equation (27) follows from the shape restrictions   0.
Conditions in (28)-(29) result from two considerations. First,  remains unchanged both
in the data-generating process and the counterfactual context. Second, the independence
between  and  can be formulated in terms of inequality restrictions which are linear in
Φ ˜  ˜ Φ and have  ˜  enter in the coeﬃcient matrix. For example, such independence
implies the coordinates in  m u s tb eo r d e r e di nt h es a m ew a ya si n;a n dΦ − Φ =
R 
 () must lie between  ( − ) and ( −) for any pair () such that
 ≥ . By the same reasoning, a similar set of linear restrictions involving ˜  ˜  ˜ Φ can be
derived for the counterfactual context. Because the unobserved state distribution remains
unchanged both in the data-generating process and the counterfactual context, these two
sets of restrictions can be combined into a single system as in (28)-(29).
It follows that a ˜  can be rationalized in a SSPE by certain  satisfying the shape and
independence restrictions if and only if the linear system in Proposition 6 admits solutions
( ˜  Φ ˜ Φ)=(  ˜ Φ ˜ Φ). Finally, note that the choice of  has no impact on the
feasibility of the linear system in Proposition 6.30
space and showed the ISCO recovered is informative. It is also practical to conduct Bayesian inference of
the ISCO in our model. For a dynamic model where a single agent chooses between binary actions each
period, Norets and Tang (2010) propose a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating the
posterior of counterfactual choice probabilities. A similar approach is possible for our model here. However,
we leave the inference of ISCO in stochastic bargaining games for future research.
29Norets and Tang (2010) use a similar argument to characterize the identiﬁed set of counterfactual choice
probabilities in a model of dynamic binary choice processes.
30If a solution exists for a given , changing the normalization constant to 
0 would simply require a
rescaling of the solution. This is not surprising because the scale of  and  needs to be normalized in29
We conclude this section by noting that the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 6 are
not only necessary but also suﬃcient for a ˜  to be implied in a SSPE by some  satisfying
  0 and the independence of  from . Hence, the ISCO characterized above reveals
the limit of what can be learned about counterfactual outcomes under these restrictions.
6 Extensions and Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented positive results in the identiﬁcation of structural elements
and counterfactual outcomes in the canonical model of stochastic sequential bargaining un-
der various data scenarios. A unifying theme of our analysis is that the model structure
and the implied counterfactual outcomes can be point- or partially-identiﬁed under weak
nonparametric restrictions (such as shape restrictions on the cake function or independence
of the distribution of unobserved state variables) given diﬀerent data availability. We have
also proposed consistent estimators for the discount factor and the cake function.
We conclude by addressing the identiﬁcation of two extensions of the canonical model and
discussing possible directions for future research. The canonical model of stochastic sequen-
tial bargaining assumes that utilities are directly transferable among players and through
time at a constant rate (i.e. the players have linear utilities and share a common discount
factor). This feature of the model implies that the game has a unique SSPE which satis-
ﬁes the separation principle. If, on the other hand, players are risk-averse and evaluate the
surplus according to a concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, or have diﬀerent
inter-temporal preferences (i.e. the discount factors are heterogeneous across players), then
the bargaining game admits multiple SSPE and the occurrence of agreements is no longer
independent of the bargaining protocol (Merlo and Wilson (1995)).31 Here, we discuss non-
parametric identiﬁcation of these two extensions of the stochastic bargaining model in the
complete data scenario. In particular, we assume that researchers observe the evolution of
states, the timing of agreements, the history of proposers and all agreed allocations. We
maintain our conditional independence (CI) and monotonicity (MT) assumptions. We also
assume that players across independent bargaining games in the data that share the same
structure adopt strategies that lead to the same proﬁle of SSPE payoﬀs.32 This ensures that
order to identify model structures and counterfactual outcomes.
31In the terminology of Merlo and Wilson (1995), these environments deﬁne stochastic bargaining games
with non-transferable utility. The characterization of the set of SSPE for these games is contained in Theorem
1 in Merlo and Wilson (1995). It is not reproduced here to economize on space.
32In either of the two cases, the proﬁles of SSPE payoﬀs for players are not unique in general. The single-
SSPE-payoﬀ assumption above is analogous to the “single-equilibrium” assumption used in the estimation of
simultaneous games with incomplete information (e.g. Bajari, Hong, Krainer and Nekipelov (2010) and Tang30
the observed distribution | is rationalized by a single SSPE instead of being a mixture
of distributions, with each component rationalized by one of the multiple SSPE. This as-
sumption allows us to relate observable distributions to the model structure while remaining
agnostic about which one of the multiple SSPE generated the data.
First, consider the canonical model described in Section 2, but suppose that all players
in the bargaining game are risk-averse and evaluate the surplus according to a common
concave utility function  : R1
+ → R1
+. The set of feasible allocations is C() ≡ { ∈ R :
P
=1 −1() ≤ ()}. We show that  can be identiﬁed with complete data if the discount
factor  is known. We normalize (0) = 0 for all ’s in the parameter space.
Proposition 7 Suppose CI and MT hold; Pr{ =1  6= |}  0 for all , ;a n d is
known. If the parameter space for the utility function Θ satisﬁes (i) 0  0 for all  ∈ Θ,
and (ii) for each pair  ˜  ∈ Θ, ˜  =  ◦  for some 00  0 or 00  0, then there does not
exist  6=˜  in Θ with 

˜˜ .
Conditions (i) and (ii) on Θ in Proposition 7 allow us to use Jensen’s Inequality re-
peatedly and prove by contradiction that  ˜  cannot be observationally equivalent under the
maintained assumptions. The assumption that Pr{ =1 6= |}  0 for all  ensures
that agreed allocations can be observed in the data with positive probability for all  and .
Proposition 7 implies that  is identiﬁed within the class of utility functions with either
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). To see
that this is the case, suppose 1 2 are both diﬀerentiable CARA functions with 2 = ◦1.
Let () ≡− 000 denote the absolute risk aversion for a generic utility function .T h e n
()0
1 = (2)−(1).B o t h(2) and (1) are constant and 0  0 by assumption.
Hence, 00 must be either strictly positive or strictly negative over its whole support. It follows
that the class of CARA utility functions satisﬁes (i) and (ii) in Proposition 7. Similar
arguments show that  is identiﬁed within the class of CRRA utility functions.
Next, consider the canonical model described in Section 2, but suppose that the players
in the bargaining game have diﬀerent discount factors ()

=1.E v e nw h e np l a y e r se v a l u a t e
the surplus according to a liner utility function, players’ utilities can be non-transferable
when their discount factors are not the same. We show that the ’s can be identiﬁed with
complete data.
(2009)). Such assumptions allow econometricians to link model structures to observable distributions using
theoretical characterizations of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) or SSPE payoﬀs, while remaining agnostic
about which BNE or SSPE payoﬀ is realized in the data-generating process.31
Proposition 8 Suppose CI and MT hold and Pr{ =1 | 6= }  0 for all .T h e n
is identiﬁed for all  =1 .
Establishing identiﬁcation of the ’s amounts to linking individual discount factors to
observed distributions of () and accepted allocations. As in the case with trans-
ferable utilities, MT ensures that there exists a one-to-one mapping between  and .T h e
regularity condition stated in the proposition ensures that with positive probability the al-
location that each player  accepts when he is not the proposer is observable from the data.
Proposition 8 diﬀers from our earlier result on the identiﬁcation of a homogeneous  with
complete data (Proposition 1) in that it fully extracts information from agreed allocations
to recover the individual-speciﬁc ’s. This is possible since Proposition 1 suggests that a
homogeneous  is over-identiﬁed from observed data.33
The cases where players evaluate the cake according to a concave utility function, or
have heterogeneous discount factors represent two of the many possible generalizations of the
canonical stochastic bargaining model. Depending on the application, other extensions may
be of interest. Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) provide equilibrium characterization results
for general model structures, including environments where the current unobserved state
may depend on future states conditional on current observed states, or where the proposer-
selection process may depend on the history of states. We intend to pursue the nonparametric
identiﬁcation and consistent estimation of general stochastic bargaining models under various
data scenarios in future work.
33Only the total surplus is used for recovering the common  in Proposition 1, even though each coordinate
in the -vector of allocations accepted by non-proposers is also suﬃcient for identiﬁng .32
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows from Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson (1998) that the
individual SSPE payoﬀ is characterized for all  ≡ (k) as
(()) ≡ max{() − [
P
6= (
0)|]   [(
0)|]} for  = k
(()) ≡ [(
0)|] for  6= k
From Theorem 2 in Merlo and Wilson (1998), the total payoﬀ in SSPE must satisfy the ﬁxed
point equation ()=m a x {()   [(0)|]} for all , and that agreements occur for 



















where the equalities follow from the independence of (0 0 0) from () given ,a n d
independence of 0 from past states and . Then (a), (b) and (c) in the lemma follow. The
uniqueness of SSPE payoﬀs follows from Theorem 3 in Merlo and Wilson (1998). 
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .( N e c e s s i t y ) Suppose there exists {|} that satisﬁes , 
and rationalizes the distribution of { } under . Recall  = ( ) and
by Lemma 1,  =1if and only if  ≥ ((0 0)|) in any SSPE. Hence under ,
the equality in (6) is implied by (+1 +1 +1| k)=+1+1+1|+1+1|,
which follows from . The time-homogeneity of | follows from time-homogeneity
of | and .U n d e r CI, ((0 0)|)=((0 0)|) and hence ()=P r { ≥
((0 0)|) | } =1 −  |(((0 0)|)). Under ,  |()=P r {() ≤ 
|  = } = |(−1()), and is strictly increasing in  on the support of  given 
(where −1() is the inverse of () given ). Under , () ∈ (01) for all ,a n d
((0 0)|) must be in the interior of the support of  | and can be recovered as 
∗().

























where the equality in (33) follows from changing variables between  and  given  under
.C o n d i t i o n(iv) must hold because the discount factor  ∈ (01). Lemma 2 of Merlo and33
Wilson (1998) implies that the individual continuation payoﬀsi nS S P E( () ≡ [(0)|])











Under CI and the independence of 0 from past states and ,w eh a v e0 =( 0 0 0)
independent of () given . Hence , as a solution to (34), depends on  only. Thus,











using change-of-variables between  0 and 0 conditional on 0.I na n ya g r e e m e n ti naSSPE,a
non-proposer is oﬀered his discounted continuation payoﬀ (). Hence condition (v) follows
from (35) with 
∗
 playing the role of  and [(0 0)|] ≡
P
 ()=
∗() for all .
(Suﬃciency) Suppose a joint distribution of { } is observed and satisﬁes
conditions for rationalizability (i)-(v).W en e e dt oﬁnd certain {|} that satisfy 
and , and could rationalize this joint distribution under CI.F i r s t ,c h o o s eany strictly
increasing distribution | and deﬁne () ≡ 
−1
 |(|()).B y c o n d i t i o n (ii),  |()
is increasing in  given .H e n c e () is increasing in  given ,a n d is satisﬁed.
Furthermore,
Pr{() ≤ |} ≡ Pr{
−1
 |(|()) ≤ |}
=P r {|() ≤  |()|} =  |()
over the support of  given . The equalities follow from (ii),a n dt h a t|() is uniform





∗() for any .
Under condition (iv),  is between (01).F i n a l l y ,  is deﬁned with  ≡ Pr{ = }.B y
construction, 








where the r.h.s. of (36) is a contraction mapping in . Using change-of-variables between  0













0)|] | } =P r { ≥ 
∗() |} =P r { =1 |} ≡ ()34
where the second equality follows from condition (iv). The condition  is also satisﬁed,


















() i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o no ft h eﬁxed-point equation that deﬁnes discounted
individual continuation payoﬀs [(0)|] under CI and MT. Conditions (iii), (iv) and (v)
ensure time-homogeneous distributions | and |=1 observed from data can be
rationalized by the {|} constructed above. Finally, construct the full transition of
states subject to CI,b yd e ﬁning for all  ≥ 0:
(+1|
) ≡ +1|(+1|+1)(+1|)
Since (6) holds with | and 0| being time-homogenous in (i), inductive argu-
ments show {|} rationalizes the joint distribution of { } as long as
{|} can rationalize | and |=1. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The proof uses Lemma A1 below, which reveals the degree of
under-identiﬁcation in (|).
Lemma A1 Suppose the true discount factor 0 is known. Then a pair (|) that sat-
isﬁes  and  can rationalize the   observed if and only if it implies the
distribution of cakes  | observed for all  ∈ Ω.
Proof of Lemma A1. Necessity follows immediately from the deﬁnition of rationalization. To
prove suﬃciency, ﬁrst note under CI and MT, changing variables between  and  shows the
discounted total continuation payoﬀ can be expressed as a unique solution for the following






Likewise, discounted continuation payoﬀsf o ri n d i v i d u a l can also be expressed as the unique









with  g i v e ni n( 3 7 ) .B o t h and , as unique solutions of (37) and (38), are determined
by 0, ,  and  |,w h e r e are directly identiﬁable and 0 is ﬁxed and known by our
supposition in the lemma.35
Suppose a generic pair (|) is such that
|(





for all . Then it necessarily implies the same total and individual continuation payoﬀsa s
the true parameters (00
|) does. As a result, (|) must imply the joint distribution of
cakes and decisions | and the distribution of accepted allocations |=1 as (00
|)
does.
We then complete the proof using inductive arguments. When  =0 , the observed
distribution is
Pr{ =0  0 0|0 = } = 0 Pr{0 ≤ 0(0) 0|0 = }
for all , which is determined by  | and  only. Hence any (|) that implies  |
for all  can also rationalize this joint distribution. It follows immediately that Pr{
0 0 0|0 = } is also rationalized by such a (|) and .W h e n =1 , the observed
distribution is:
Pr( =1  0 1 0 11|0)
=P r ( 1 =1  1 1|1 0 =0  0 0 0)Pr(1|0 =0  0 0 0)Pr(0 =0  0 0|0)
=P r ( 1|1 =1  1 1)1 Pr(1 =1 |1)(1|0)0 Pr(0 =0  0|0)
where the equalities follow from CI and that an observed, rationalizable distribution Pr( =
1−1 ) necessarily satisﬁes the condition (i) in Lemma 2. Recall  are directly
identiﬁed from data. As shown above, any (|) that satisﬁes (39) implies the same
 | (and therefore |=1 and |) for all  as the truth (00
|). Hence such a
pair (|) can generate the same Pr( =1 −1 ) as (00
|). It follows
immediately that Pr(111 1) is also rationalized by such a (|) and .
Now suppose for some  ≥ 1,ap a i r(|) rationalizes the observable distribution
Pr( = −1 ) for all  ≤  as well as Pr(    ). Then consider the
case with  =  +1 .F o ra n y0,




















where the equalities again follow from necessary conditions for rationalizability in Lemma
2. By supposition at the beginning of this induction step, (|) rationalizes Pr(| =
1), Pr( =1 |) and Pr(   |0).I ta l s of o l l o w st h a tPr( +1+1+1 +1)
is rationalized by such a (|) and . ¤
That 0 is identiﬁed follows from the proof of the necessity of (iv) in Lemma 2. Part (ii) of
Proposition 1 follows immediately from Lemma A1 above. When  ⊥  and the distribution
of  is normalized to any , the cake function is recovered as 0()=
−1
 |(()).T h i s
is because  |() 0() are strictly increasing in  and  respectively given any  and
 |()= |(0()) = (). 

















For any ﬁxed ,the weak law of large numbers implies ˆ ()

→ ().A l s o f o r a n y ﬁxed ,
the Glivenko-Cantelli Lemma suggests sup∈R | ˆ  |(|) −  |(|)| → 0 almost surely.I t
then follows from standard arguments that ˆ ()

→ 
∗() for all . By the Uniform Law of
Large Numbers, for any ,
sup
∈(∗())





−  [max{}| = ]
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯

−→ 0
Since [max{}| = ] is continuous at  = 
∗() conditional on any , it then follows




Also note ˆ 0|

→ 0|, and hence Slutsky’s Theorem implies
P
0∈Ω










and recall from (11) that [max{ 0
∗(0)}| = ]=(;0).S i n c e (;0) 6=0by












for all  ∈ .T h e nˆ 

→ 0 follows from the fact
P
∈Ω  =1 . 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . The proof of consistency builds on results in Lemma A2-4
below. For any  ≡ ( ) ∈ Ω,d e ﬁne () ≡ {˜  ∈ Ω :˜  =  ∧ (˜ ) ≥ 1
2} and37
ˆ () ≡ {˜  ∈ Ω :˜  =  ∧ ˜  ∈ ˆ Ω
+
}.N o t eˆ () implicitly depends on the signiﬁcance
level  used for testing the null 0 : () ≥ 12.
Lemma A2 For any  ∈ (01), Pr{ˆ ()=()} → 1 as  → +∞ for all  ∈ Ω.
Proof of Lemma A2. By deﬁnition, ˆ () 6= () if and only if ∃ˆ  such that ˆ  =  and
either “ˆ  ∈ ˆ Ω
+
 but ˆ  6∈ Ω
+
”o r“ ˆ  ∈ Ω
+
 but ˆ  6∈ ˆ Ω
+
”. Hence:











ˆ  [ˆ (ˆ ) − 05]  −051−}
By deﬁnition, (ˆ )  1
2 for any ˆ  6∈ (). Hence as  → +∞,
Pr{
12
ˆ  [ˆ (ˆ ) − (ˆ )] + 
12
ˆ  [(ˆ ) − 05] ≥− 051−} → 0
for all ˆ  6∈ (). This follows from the fact that for all ˆ , 
12
ˆ  [ˆ (ˆ ) − (ˆ )] converges in
distribution to a normal distribution as  → +∞. By a similar argument and the condition
(iii) in RG,w eh a v ePr{
12
ˆ  [ˆ (ˆ ) − 05]  −051−} → 0 for all ˆ  ∈ (). Hence the r.h.s.
of (40) converges to 0 as  → +∞. ¤




 |=1 whenever ˆ 

→ .
P r o o fo fL e m m aA 3 . Let ˆ  |=1 denote the empirical distribution of  given  =1and
. Suppose ∃0 such that | ˆ ˆ 
 |=1 − 
 |=1|  . Then at least one of the following
two conditions must hold: (a) ∃1  0 such that |ˆ  − |  1;o r( b )∃2  0 such that
sup∈R | ˆ  |=1() −  |=1()|  2. To see this, suppose ˆ  =  and |ˆ  − | 
where ˆ ,  are shorthands for ˆ 
 |=1, 
 |=1 respectively. By (ii) in the regularity
conditions RG, ∃0 such that | |=1(ˆ ) −  |=1()|  . By construction
ˆ  |=1(ˆ )= |=1()=, and this suggests | |=1(ˆ ) −  |=1()|  .









≤ Pr{|ˆ  − |  1} +P r
n
sup∈R | ˆ  |=1() −  |=1()|  2
o
(41)
Under the condition that ˆ 

−→ ,t h eﬁrst term on the r.h.s. converges to zero as  → +∞.
Conditional on  =1and  = , the observations  are i.i.d. and the Glivenko-
Cantelli Theorem applies and sup∈R | ˆ  |=1|() −  |=1()|
 −→ 0 for all . Hence the
second term on the r.h.s. in (41) vanishes as  → +∞. ¤38





˜ ∈Ω ˆ (;˜ )1{˜  ∈ ˆ ()}
P
˜ ∈Ω 1{˜  ∈ ˆ ()}
(42)




P r o o fo fL e m m aA 4 . Since ˆ ()

→ () for all  ∈ Ω, ˆ 
0 
→ 0 for all  ∈ Ω,  ∈ A and
the corresponding 0.T h e nb yL e m m aA 3 ,w eh a v e ,f o ra n y˜  ∈ (),
ˆ (;˜ )= ˆ 

 |=1 + ˆ 
05






 |=1 + 
05
 |˜  − 
0
 |=1˜  = () (43)
for any  ∈ Ω,  ∈ A and the corresponding 0. This follows from the Slutsky’s Theorem




 |˜  for any ˜  ∈ Ω
+
. Note (43) holds for all  in Ω, including
 ∈ Ω
+
.T h i si sb e c a u s et h ei d e n t i ﬁcation in part (iv) of Proposition 3 applies immediately
for any  ∈ Ω
+
.L e t  denote the event “ˆ () ⊆ ()”a n d
 denote its complement.
Then for any 0,
Pr{|ˆ 
∗
() − ()|  }
=P r {|ˆ 
∗
() − ()| ∧ } +P r {|ˆ 
∗
() − ()| ∧ 

} (44)
By Lemma A2, Pr{
} → 0 (and therefore the second term on the r.h.s. of (44) vanishes) as
 → +∞.N o t eˆ ∗
 takes the form of an average and therefore the event “|ˆ ∗
() − ()| 
and  happens” implies max˜ ∈() |ˆ (;˜ )−()| must be larger than ∗ ≡ #{()}  0,
where #{()} denotes the cardinality of (). It then follows:
Pr{|ˆ 
∗
() − ()| ∧ } ≤
P
˜ ∈() Pr{|ˆ (;˜ ) − ()| 
∗} (45)
with the r.h.s. of (45) vanishes as  → +∞ because of (43) and #{()}  +∞. ¤
For any  ∈ Ω and 0, by construction,














n¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ 
05
 | − ()





If  6∈ Ω
+
, the second term on the r.h.s. of (46) vanishes as  → +∞ by Lemma A2 while the
ﬁrst term converges to 0 because ˆ ∗
()






by the Slutsky’s Theorem. If  ∈ Ω
+
,t h e nt h eﬁrst term vanishes by Lemma A2 while the




 | = () for all  ∈ Ω
+
. 39










That () ≡ |(()−()) ∈ (01) for all  implies ()−()=|(()).T h u st h e
function  can be characterized as a solution to the quasi-structural ﬁxed-point equation
 =  ◦ ,w h e r e








max{|(()) − 0}| (48)
For any given  (with | known and  observed),  is a contraction mapping. Hence with
knowledge of  and |, the discounted total continuation payoﬀ  can be recovered as
the unique solution to (47). Hence () can be identiﬁed as ()=()+|(()) for
all  ∈ Ω. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Ap a i r() generates the outcome  in a SSPE if and only if
a linear system of  equations holds:
 =  − Π (49)
where  is a -vector with the -th coordinate  ≡ −1
 () with  ≡ ();a n dΠ
solves
Π = (Π + Φ) (50)
where the -th coordinate of Φ is Φ ≡ (;)=
R
max{ − 0}.T h eo u t c o m e




2;)= for some constant 0.T h u s  is
conditional median of cake sizes under this location normalization. As in the text, we use
() to denote the -th smallest coordinate in a generic vector . Proof of Proposition 6
uses Lemma A5 below.
Lemma A5 Suppose CI, AS hold and  is independent from .Av e c t o r can be rationalized
in a bargaining game with discount factor , state transition ,a n d() such that   0
and  is increasing on R1 with −1























(+1) − ˆ 

()) ≤ ˆ 
Φ






(+1) − ˆ 

()) ∀ ∈ {1}(53)40
with ∗ ≡ [ 1
2], ˆ  ≡ [0] and ˆ Φ ≡ [Φ].
P r o o fo fL e m m aA 5 . (Necessity) Suppose  is rationalized by some () with   0 and
 is independent of  with median 0.T h e nl e t = −1
 () ≡ () and Φ = (;).
It follows from the substitution of (50) into (49),  ⊥  and monotonicity of  on R1 that
(51) and (52) must hold for Φ.T h ed e ﬁnition of  and an application of the Leibniz rule





which is bounded between ( − ) and ( − ). Hence (53) holds for Φ
with  ≡ (12;). More generally, if the normalization uses certain constant  such that
 6= (12;), the system linear restrictions (51)-(53) still hold for the scale multiples  ≡

(05;)[(1) ()] and Φ ≡

(05;)[(1;)(;)] as (05;)  0. Hence
(51)-(53) hold with ( Φ)=( Φ).
(Suﬃciency) We need to show that if (51)-(53) holds for some  Φ then there must
be a pair () such that  ⊥ ,  is increasing on R1, the shape restrictions   0
are satisﬁed, and () rationalizes  as the probability for agreements in SSPE. We can
construct such a  by ﬁrst setting its -percentile () equal to , (05) = 0 and
(12;) equal to the positive constant , and then interpolating between () so that
(()) is equal to Φ. This is possible because inequality restrictions (53) are satisﬁed. An
unobserved state distribution constructed this way is independent from  and increasing over
R1 with (05) = 0.T h e nd e ﬁne  = +( −)−1Φ and the pair () satisﬁes the
restrictions on  by construction. Furthermore () also rationalizes  by construction
because there exists Π such that (49) and (50) hold jointly. ¤
In both types of counterfactual analyses considered, the distribution  is ﬁxed in the data-
generating process and the counterfactual context. When  is ﬁxed while  changed to
˜ ,w eh a v e =  + ( − )−1Φ = ˜  + ( −  ˜ )−1 ˜ ˜ Φ.W h e n  is ﬁxed while 
changed to ˜  = ,w eh a v e =  + ( − )−1Φ from the data-generating process
and  = ˜  + ( −  ˜ )−1 ˜ ˜ Φ in the counterfactual context. The rest of the proof follows
from arguments in Lemma A5. 






















0 = )|]+ [(
0)1(
0 6= )|]41



























































where the ﬁrst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and the second equality
follows from the fact that under CI, 00=k|0 = k0|0. Furthermore, under MT,  is













































≡ (;−  |)
where  | is the distribution induced by |. Likewise, under CI, the second term

























And the third term is
 [(
0)1(




H e n c ew ec a nw r i t e = Ψ(;0|  |) where Ψ is a R- v a l u e df u n c t i o nw i t ht h e
























For notational ease, we suppress dependence of the ﬁxed point equation on (0|  |).
Deﬁne the accepted allocation for a non-proposer  in state  as ()=−1(()).T h a t42
Pr( =1 6= |)  0 for all  and  implies for each individual  and , there is positive
probability that an agreement is reached when he is not the proposer. Hence for each player
, () is observed over Ω as the accepted allocation for a non-proposer  in state .D e ﬁne
∗
 ≡  −
P






0)+[ (1 − (
0)) + 1 − ](
0)(
0|) (55)









 )| =1 ]
While determined by the unknown , the functions {}
=1,  and  ∗|=1 are all observable
from data, and therefore are considered ﬁxed for the set of  ˜  that are restricted to be
observationally equivalent. We complete the proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists
 6=˜  in Θ and 

˜˜ .L e t˜  denote solutions to ﬁxed point equations corresponding to
 ˜  respectively
 = Ψ(;); ˜  = Ψ(˜ ;˜ )
By supposition of observational equivalence of  and ˜ ,w eh a v ef o ra l l and almost every-
where on Ω,
(;) ≡ 
−1((;)) = ˜ 
−1(˜ (;˜ )) ≡ (;˜ ) (56)
(;) ≡ Pr( =1 |;)=P r (  =1 |;˜ ) ≡ (;˜ ) (57)
It follows that for the distribution of cake size  | observed, the same conditional distrib-
ution  ∗| is induced by both  ˜ . Suppose ˜  =  ◦  for some strictly concave function
 : R1
+ → R1
+.T h e n¯ (;˜ )=¯ (; ◦ ) ◦ ¯ (;) by concavity of  and the Jensen’s








0;˜ )+[ (1 − (
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0;)+[ (1 − (
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=  ◦ ((;)) = ˜ ((;)) = ˜ ((;˜ ))43
where the inequalities all follow from concavity of  and applications of Jensen’s Inequality as
well as (56) and (57). In addition, the last inequality also uses (0) = 0 (implied by (0) = 0
for all  ∈ Θ). This constitutes a contradiction. The proof for the case with ˜  =  ◦  for
some strictly convex function  follows from symmetric arguments and is omitted. Hence
/ ∃ 6=˜  in Θ such that 

˜˜ . 




The regularity condition stated in the proposition guarantees ()=[(0)|] is iden-



















Under MT,  is increasing in  conditional on . After changing variables between  and




















˜ () ≡ 
Z
max{ − Σ()0} |
= [ − Σ()| =1 ]

Appendix B: Choice of | and Counterfactuals
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 suggests 0 and 0
| c a n n o tb ej o i n t l yi d e n t i ﬁed even with 0
identiﬁed and considered known. Thus it is tempting to think setting 0
| to some known
distribution (say, uniform on [01] for all ) in estimation is a necessary normalization for44
structural estimations. Nonetheless, such an arbitrary choice of the unobserved state dis-
tribution can lead to errors in predicting counterfactual distributions of () if the cake
function (mapping from states to surplus) is changed. Below we show the only special case
where such a choice does not preclude correct counterfactual analyses is when  ⊥ .
Suppose econometricians choose some arbitrary distribution ˜ |(˜ ) for each  that is
increasing in ˜  in structural estimation, while the true underlying parameters are {00
|}.
The cake function is then recovered as
˜ (˜ )= |( ˜ |(˜ )) (59)
It is straightforward to show that ˜ 0 are related as
˜ (˜ )=0(
0
|( ˜ |=(˜ ))) (60)
where 0
|() denotes the inverse of 0







for all ,w h e r e
−1
0 ˜ −1 are inverses of 0˜  at  for any given  ,a n d ˜ | is the inverse of
˜ |. Suppose researchers are interested in knowing the distribution of cake sizes if the cake
function is perturbed to 

0()=0(()) for all ,. That is, for a given USV, the cake
size under  =  in the counterfactual environment would equal that in state  = () in
the current data-generating process.
With normalization ˜ | in place, the econometrician can ﬁrst recover ˜ (˜ ) from  |
as in (59), and then construct the counterfactual structural function of interest from ˜ 
as ˜ (˜ ) ≡ ˜ (()˜ ). However, the true counterfactual distribution of cake sizes is




0 (())), while the one predicted under the
normalization is:
Pr{˜ (()˜ ) ≤ | = ; ˜ |} = ˜ | ◦ ˜ 
−1(()))





where  ◦ () is a shorthand for the composite function (()), and the second equality
follows from (61). In general, ˜ | ◦ ˜ |=() ◦0
|=() 6= 0
|, and hence the normalization
˜ | may lead to errors in predicting the distribution of () in the counterfactual context.
In the special case where 0
| i sk n o w nt ob ei n d e p e n d e n to f,c h o o s i n ga n y˜  (independent
of ) indeed amounts to a normalization that is innocuous for the counterfactual exercise.
This is obvious from the fact that with 0
 and ˜  both independent from , ˜ ( ˜ (0
 ())) =
0
 () holds trivially for all .45
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